The underground economy and its macroeconomic consequences
AbstractThis study develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. The cost to firms of evading taxes is that they find themselves subject to credit rationing from banks. Our model simulations show that in the absence of budgetary flexibility to adjust expenditures, raising tax rates too high drives firms into the underground economy, thereby reducing the tax base. Aggregate investment in the economy is lowered because of credit rationing. Taxes that are too low eliminate the underground economy, but result in unsustainable budget and trade deficits. Thus, the optimal rate of taxation, from a macroeconomic point of view, may lead to some underground activity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.
Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?id=300262
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- cre - - - - - -
- rat - - - - - -
- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- Cla - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
- C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
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