Entry Deterrence and Entry Inducement in an Industry with Complementary Products
AbstractThis paper discusses the possibility of signal jamming between multiple informed incumbents with conflicting interests and examines the implication of the possibility in the limit pricing literature. I find fully separating equilibria where the incumbent competing against the entrant does not use limit pricing in an optimal response to “inductive pricing” by another incumbent desiring entry i.e., charging a lower price than the static equilibrium price to induce entry. Thus, contrary to Milgrom and Roborts, the consequences of asymmetric information for welfare are ambiguous even in fully separating equilibria. [L11]
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal International Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 17 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RIEJ20
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- Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1987. "Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 211-231, Summer.
- Michael H. Riordan, 1985. "Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 41-50, Spring.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982.
"Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March.
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1998. "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Levine's Working Paper Archive 245, David K. Levine.
- Schultz, Christian, 1999.
"Limit pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 801-825, August.
- Christian Schultz, 1997. "Limit Pricing when Incumbents have Conflicting Interests," CIE Discussion Papers 1997-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
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