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Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Le Breton

    (Greqam, UniversitÊd'Aix-Marseille 2, Institut Universitaire de France Chateau Lafarge, Route des Milles, 13290, Les Milles, France)

  • Guillaume Hollard

    (Greqam, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Centre de la Vieille CharitÊ, 2, Rue de la CharitÊ, 13002, Marseille, France)

Abstract

In this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Le Breton & Guillaume Hollard, 1996. "Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(4), pages 451-455.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:4:p:451-455
    Note: Received: 3 March 1995/Accepted: 24 July 1995
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    Cited by:

    1. Shaofang Qi, 2016. "A characterization of the n-agent Pareto dominance relation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 695-706, March.
    2. Lee Gibson & Robert Powers, 2012. "An extension of McGarvey’s theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 101-108, January.
    3. Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "Compromise in combinatorial vote," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 175-206, July.
    4. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
    5. Jerry S. Kelly & Shaofang Qi, 2016. "A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda’s rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 113-125, June.
    6. William Gehrlein & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2017. "The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 315-327, August.
    7. Mala, Jozsef, 1999. "On [lambda]-majority voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-44, January.
    8. João V. Ferreira, 2016. "The Tree that Hides the Forest: A Note on Revealed Preference," Working Papers halshs-01386451, HAL.

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