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Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Novosad

    (Dartmouth College)

  • Eric Werker

    (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60-year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world’s most representative international institution. The results indicate which states are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Democracy, investment in diplomacy, foreign aid, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions—even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the influence of the United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in U.S. influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Novosad & Eric Werker, 2019. "Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-33, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:14:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9294-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-017-9294-z
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    2. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin F. & Richert, Katharina, 2019. "The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 242-254.
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    6. Parizek, Michal & Stephen, Matthew D., 2021. "The Increasing Representativeness of International Organizations’ Secretariats: Evidence from the United Nations System, 1997–2015," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 65(1), pages 197-209.
    7. Elizabeth M. Moore & Kristin Brandl & Luis Alfonso Dau, 2023. "Intergovernmental organizations, institutional schisms, and business environments," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    United Nations; Power; International organizations; Soft power; Bureaucracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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