Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued
AbstractWe consider private good economies with single-plateaued preferences. A solution selects for each preference profile a non-empty set of allocations. An agent strictly prefers a set of allocations to another set of allocations if and only if he strictly prefers any allocation in the first set to any in the second set according to his single-plateaued preference relation. We characterize the class of sequential-allotment solutions by essentially single-valuedness, Pareto-indifference, and coalitional stragety-proofness. These solutions are the Pareto-indifferent extensions of the solutions studied by Barberà et al. 1997.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: 9 May 2000 / Accepted: 1 May 2001
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
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- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2013.
Cahiers de recherche
04-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans, 2013. "Single-basined choice," Cahiers de recherche 2013-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bossert W. & Peters H.J.M., 2013. "Single-basined choice," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2013.
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 134-139.
- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2012. "Single-Plateaued Choice," Cahiers de recherche 05-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Bossert Walter & Peters Hans, 2012. "Single-plateaued choice," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans, 2012. "Single-plateaued choice," Cahiers de recherche 2012-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars Ehlers, 2011. "A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 447-452, December.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
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