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On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture

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Author Info

  • Klaus Ritzberger

    ()
    (Institute for Advanced Studies, Department of Economics, Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria)

  • Werner Güth

    (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Spandauer Strasse 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany)

Abstract

Consider the durable goods monopoly game with uniformly distributed consumers' valuations. To establish the Coase-Conjecture in this context takes an infinite time horizon and a negligible delay between market rounds. An infinite time horizon or patience of market participants alone are not sufficient for the Coase-Conjecture, nor is an arbitrarily small delay between price offers within a finite time horizon.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 3 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 215-236

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:215-236

Note: Received: 20 March 1996 / Accepted: 15 December 1997
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Cited by:
  1. Kaas, Leo & Madden, Paul, 1999. "Equilibrium Involuntary Unemployment under Oligempory," Economics Series 68, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  2. Di Maria, Corrado & Köttl, Johannes, 2002. "Lagged Network Externalities and Rationing in a Software Monopoly," Economics Series 120, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  3. Geoffrey Brennan & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2004. "Approximate Truth in Economic Modelling," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  4. Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2009. "Intra-firm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-007, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  5. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2013. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 219-43, November.

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