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Estate taxation with warm-glow altruism

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  • Carlos Garriga
  • Fernando Sánchez-Losada

    ()

Abstract

This article examines the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with warm-glow altruism (utility interdependence) and heterogeneous individuals. We propose a new efficiency concept, D-efficiency, that considers an implicit constraint in the act of giving: donors cannot bequeath to donees more than their existing resources. Considering this constraint, we show that the market equilibrium is not socially efficient. The efficient level of bequest transfers can be implemented by the market with estate and labor-income subsidies and a capital-income tax. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, the government faces a trade-off between minimizing distortions and eliminating external effects. The implied tax policy differs from Pigovian taxation since the government's ability to correct the external effects is limited. Finally, we show that the efficiency-equity trade-off does not affect the qualitative features of the optimal distortionary fiscal policy.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Portuguese Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 8 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 99-118

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Handle: RePEc:spr:portec:v:8:y:2009:i:2:p:99-118

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Related research

Keywords: Optimal taxation; Altruism; Dynamic general equilibrium; H21; H30; E62;

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References

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  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Wealth transfer taxation: a survey of the theoretical literature," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
  2. Andres Erosa & Martin Gervais, 2000. "Optimal taxation in life-cycle economies," Working Paper 00-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  3. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1998. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy," Staff Report 251, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  4. William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, 1994. "Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 145-160, Fall.
  5. Laitner, John, 1993. "Intergenerational and interhousehold economic links," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 189-238 Elsevier.
  6. Carlos Garriga-Calvet, 2000. "Optimal Fiscal Policy in Overlapping Generations Models," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1772, Econometric Society.
  7. Mariacristina Nardi, 2004. "Wealth Inequality and Intergenerational Links," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 743-768, 07.
  8. Davies, James B. & Shorrocks, Anthony F., 2000. "The distribution of wealth," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 605-675 Elsevier.
  9. MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Fiscal policy in an overlapping generations model with bequest-as-consumption," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1988, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Robert E. Lucas Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital," Discussion Papers 532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "The Contribution of Intergenerational Transfers to Total Wealth: A Reply," NBER Working Papers 1827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1998. "Fiscal policy when individuals differ regarding to altruism and labor supply," CORE Discussion Papers 1998040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. About estate subsidies and capital income taxation
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-09-10 14:41:00
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Cited by:
  1. Carlos Garriga & Fernando Sánchez-Losada, 2009. "Indirect taxation and the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy," Working Papers 2009-047, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  2. Bullard, James & Garriga, Carlos & Waller, Christopher J., 2012. "Demographics, redistribution, and optimal inflation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 419-440.
  3. repec:fip:fedlps:y:2012:i:may30 is not listed on IDEAS

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