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The Manipulability of the Shapley-Value

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  • Thomson, William

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 17 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 101-27

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:101-27

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Cited by:
  1. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  2. Rodrigo Velez & William Thomson, 2009. "Let them cheat!," RCER Working Papers 552, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  3. KIBRIS, Özgür, . "Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: pure exchange and public good economies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1546, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes," Staff General Research Papers 10130, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.
  7. Gomez, Juan Camilo, 2006. "Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 254-263, November.
  8. Sanchez, Francisco Sanchez, 2002. "About inheritance distribution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 297-309, July.
  9. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
  10. Velez, Rodrigo A., 2011. "Are incentives against economic justice?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 326-345, January.

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