A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions

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A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions

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Guillaume Carlier ()
Ludovic Renou ()

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Ludovic Renou

Abstract

In simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have shown that optimal debt contracts are simple debt contracts where borrowers repay a fixed interest rate whenever possible and lenders seize all the profit when borrowers default. In this note, we depart from their works by assuming that borrowers and lenders have heterogeneous beliefs, and show that simple debt contracts do not necessarily survive as optimal contracts. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (02)
Pages: 497-504
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:497-504

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Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma & Anne Villamil, 2008. "Bankruptcy and firm finance," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 239-266, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ludovic Renou & Guillaume Carlier, 2003. "Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 7(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
Marie-Louise Vierø, 2006. "Contracting in Vague Environments," Working Papers 1106, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
G. Carlier & L. Renou, 2005. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Game Theory and Information 0502003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- G. Carlier & L. Renou, 2006. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 461-473, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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