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Bankruptcy and firm finance

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  • Stefan Krasa

    ()

  • Tridib Sharma

    ()

  • Anne Villamil

    ()

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 239-266

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:36:y:2008:i:2:p:239-266

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Enforcement; Default; Bankruptcy; Legal environment; Contracts; Limited commitment; Debt; Creditor protection; Inflation; E61; G10; K40;

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References

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  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
  2. Satyajit Chatterjee & Dean Corbae & Makoto Nakajima & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2002. "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default," Centro de Alti­simos Estudios Ri­os Pe©rez(CAERP), Centro de Altisimos Estudios Rios Perez (CAERP) 2, Centro de Altisimos Estudios Rios Perez (CAERP).
  3. Hyeok Jeong & Robert M. Townsend, 2005. "Sources of TFP Growth: Occupational Choice and Financial Deepening," IEPR Working Papers 05.28, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR), revised May 2005.
  4. Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 583, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. G. Carlier & L. Renou, 2006. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 461-473, 06.
  6. Elisabeth Huybens & Gaetano Antinolfi, 1998. "Capital accumulation and real exchange rate behavior in a small open economy with credit market frictions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 461-488.
  7. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  8. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 497-504, 02.
  9. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
  10. Costas Azariadis & Leo Kaas, 2007. "Is dynamic general equilibrium a theory of everything?," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 13-41, July.
  11. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  12. Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michele Tertilt, 2003. "Consumer bankruptcy: a fresh start," Working Papers 617, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  13. Krasa, Stefan & Sharma, Tridib & Villamil, Anne P., 2005. "Debt contracts and cooperative improvements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 857-874, November.
  14. Renou, Ludovic & Carlier, Guillaume, 2006. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7447, Paris Dauphine University.
  15. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-61, October.
  16. Gaetano Antinolfi & Elisabeth Huybens, 2004. "Domestic financial market frictions, unrestricted international capital flows, and crises in small open economies," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 811-837, November.
  17. Boyd, John H. & Levine, Ross & Smith, Bruce D., 2001. "The impact of inflation on financial sector performance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 221-248, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Zeng, Zhixiong, 2010. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 24752, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Hans Hvide & Tore Leite, 2010. "Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 149-165, July.
  3. Gaetano Antinolfi, 2012. "Costly Monitoring, Dynamic Incentives, and Default," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 892, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Karel Janda, 2007. "Optimal Debt Contracts in Emerging Markets with Multiple Investors," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2007(2), pages 115-129.
  5. Zhixiong Zeng, 2013. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 729-754, March.
  6. Kartik Athreya & Ahmet Akyol, 2007. "Unsecured Credit and Self-Employment," 2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. José-María Da-Rocha & Eduardo-Luis Giménez & Francisco-Xavier Lores, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 499-535, August.
  8. Mahmoud Nabi & Taoufik Rajhi, 2013. "Banking, contract enforcement and economic growth," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 83-100, March.
  9. Antonio Antunes & Tiago Cavalcanti & Anne Villamil, 2006. "The Effect of Financial Repression & Enforcement on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development," Development Economics Working Papers 21816, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  10. Kartik Athreya & Ahmet Akyol, 2009. "Credit and self-employment," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 09-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  11. Weerachart Kilenthong, 2011. "Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 475-501, April.
  12. Antunes, Antonio R. & Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., 2007. "Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 203-224, January.
  13. Antunes, António & Cavalcanti, Tiago & Villamil, Anne, 2008. "The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 278-297, March.

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