Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game
AbstractWe present a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possibly out-of-equilibrium beliefs about other players' preferences that also incorporates random utility (noise). We estimate the model using the data from the four-country ultimatum game experiments of Roth et al. (1991). We find evidence that in the US and in Israel, the estimated beliefs of proposers are stationary and out-of-equilibrium, that in Slovenia, they are in equilibrium, and that in Japan, they are out-of-equilibrium, change from period to period and move away from equilibrium over time. In Japan and in the US, the estimated proposers' beliefs are further away from the uniform prior than the estimated equilibrium beliefs. The results seem to provide support for a non-pecuniary payoff explanation in all countries. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (09)
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- Miguel Costa-Gomes & Klaus G. Zauner, . "Learning, Non-equilibrium Beliefs, and Non-pecuniary Payoffs in an Experimental Game," Discussion Papers 00/59, Department of Economics, University of York.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C19 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Other
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D - Microeconomics
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- Georg Weizsäcker, 2003.
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