A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements
AbstractIn this note we show that the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining theory does not hold if the number of feasible agreements is finite. It will be shown that any Pareto-efficient agreement (belonging to the finite set of feasible agreements) can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game, provided the length of a single bargaining period is sufficiently small.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 1 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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