The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing
AbstractThe rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos  over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These conditions restrict the shape of the cost function and the distribution of demands.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: July 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
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- Justin Leroux, 2006.
"Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case,"
Cahiers de recherche
06-11, HEC MontrÃ©al, Institut d'Ã©conomie appliquÃ©e.
- Leroux, Justin, 2008. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 558-572, March.
- Hougaard, Jens Leth & Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 2001. "Mixed serial cost sharing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 51-68, January.
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Peter Ã˜sterdal, 2007.
"Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: an Axiomatic Characterization,"
07-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Jens Hougaard & Lars Ã˜sterdal, 2009. "Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 469-479, November.
- Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
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