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The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing

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  • Jens Leth Hougaard

    (Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, DENMARK)

  • Lars Thorlund-Petersen

    (Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, DENMARK)

Abstract

The rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos [1] over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These conditions restrict the shape of the cost function and the distribution of demands.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 355-362

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:355-362

Note: Received: July 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999
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Related research

Keywords: Serial cost sharing; The stand-alone test; The core.;

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Cited by:
  1. Justin Leroux, 2006. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Cahiers de recherche 06-11, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  2. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 2001. "Mixed serial cost sharing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 51-68, January.
  3. Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2007. "Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: an Axiomatic Characterization," Discussion Papers 07-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.

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