IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/inecre/v58y2023i1d10.1007_s41775-023-00158-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Informal creditors and sovereign debt restructuring

Author

Listed:
  • Sayantan Ghosal

    (University of Glasgow)

  • Dania Thomas

    (University of Glasgow)

Abstract

A conventional view of sovereign debt restructuring suggests that costly sovereign debt restructuring is required to lower the interest rate charged on it. In the presence of a negative external shock, under certain conditions, we show that (a) debt restructuring leads to interim social welfare gains and ex ante efficiency gains, (b) participation by citizens will lead to efficient debt restructuring. Using our results, we discuss provide a normative case for the proposed UNCTAD Roadmap.

Suggested Citation

  • Sayantan Ghosal & Dania Thomas, 2023. "Informal creditors and sovereign debt restructuring," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 211-226, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inecre:v:58:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s41775-023-00158-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s41775-023-00158-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s41775-023-00158-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s41775-023-00158-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2003. "Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 276-304, April.
    2. Robert Devlin & Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, 1995. "The great Latin America debt crisis: a decade of asymmetric adjustment," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, vol. 15(3), pages 418-445.
    3. Robert Devlin & Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, 1995. "The great Latin America debt crisis: a decade of asymmetric adjustment," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, vol. 15(3), pages 117-142.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. D. M. Nachane, 2016. "Global Crisis, Regulatory Reform and International Policy Coordination," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 5(1), pages 63-95, June.
    2. Christoph Trebesch, 2019. "Resolving sovereign debt crises: the role of political risk," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 421-444.
    3. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    4. Chamon, Marcos & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2018. "Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 114, pages 164-179.
    5. Christoph Trebesch & Mr. Michael G. Papaioannou & Mr. Udaibir S Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 2012/203, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Chuck Fang & Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch, 2021. "Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 155-196, March.
    7. Francesca Caselli & Matilde Faralli & Paolo Manasse & Ugo Panizza, 2021. "On the Benefits of Repaying," IMF Working Papers 2021/233, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Engelen, Christian & Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2007. "Fairness in sovereign debt restructuring," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-50-07, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    9. Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013. "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 68-78.
    10. Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, 2015. "What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    11. Christoph Trebesch, 2009. "The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies: How Much is theprivate Sector Affected?," IMF Working Papers 2009/029, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Kartik Anand & Prasanna Gai, 2019. "Pre-emptive sovereign debt restructuring and holdout litigation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 364-381.
    13. Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wynne, Jose, 2005. "Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 47-72, September.
    14. Kim, Young-Han, 2011. "International policy coordination mechanism with respect to the moral hazards of financial intermediaries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1914-1922, July.
    15. Sönke Häseler, 2009. "Collective Action Clauses In International Sovereign Bond Contracts – Whence The Opposition?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 882-923, December.
    16. Trebesch, Christoph, 2008. "Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructurings. Should we really blame the creditors?," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zurich 2008 44, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    17. Andrew G Haldane & Gregor Irwin & Victoria Saporta, 2004. "Bail out or work out? theoretical considerations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(494), pages 130-148, March.
    18. Goderis, Benedikt & Wagner, Wolf, 2009. "Credit Derivatives and Sovereign Debt Crises," MPRA Paper 17314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
    20. Marcus H. Miller, 2002. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts--Or No Change?," Policy Briefs PB02-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt; Restructuring; Default; Welfare; Ex ante; Interim; Elite; Non-elite; Payoffs; Non-contractible;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:inecre:v:58:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s41775-023-00158-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.