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Solving matrix games with linguistic payoffs

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  • Laxminarayan Sahoo

    (Raniganj Girls’ College)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduced a matrix game with linguistic payoffs. In order to solve the matrix game with linguistic payoffs a solution methodology has been proposed. This proposed methodology is based on fuzzy representation of linguistic payoffs and defuzzification of fuzzy payoffs. In this method, the linguistic variable has been represented by fuzzy number. Here, widely known Yager’s Ranking Index method has been utilized for defuzzification of fuzzy number. Finally, to illustrate the solution procedure of the proposed game problem, an example has been provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Laxminarayan Sahoo, 2019. "Solving matrix games with linguistic payoffs," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 10(4), pages 484-490, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ijsaem:v:10:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s13198-018-0714-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s13198-018-0714-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    2. Vijay, V. & Chandra, S. & Bector, C.R., 2005. "Matrix games with fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 425-429, October.
    3. Prasun Kumar Nayak & Madhumangal Pal, 2009. "Linear Programming Technique To Solve Two Person Matrix Games With Interval Pay-Offs," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 26(02), pages 285-305.
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    Cited by:

    1. Priyanka Nagar & Pankaj Kumar Srivastava & Amit Srivastava, 2022. "A new dynamic score function approach to optimize a special class of Pythagorean fuzzy transportation problem," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 13(2), pages 904-913, June.
    2. Shuying Li & Guoping Tu, 2022. "Probabilistic Linguistic Matrix Game Based on Fuzzy Envelope and Prospect Theory with Its Application," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-30, March.

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