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Equilibrium in risk-sharing games

Author

Listed:
  • Michail Anthropelos

    (University of Piraeus)

  • Constantinos Kardaras

    (London School of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. In this paper, we propose a game where agents’ strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow–Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents’ best response problems have unique solutions. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation, and it is proved to exist for an arbitrary number of agents and to be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents declare beliefs on future random outcomes different from their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (among other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk-tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium than compared to the Arrow–Debreu one.

Suggested Citation

  • Michail Anthropelos & Constantinos Kardaras, 2017. "Equilibrium in risk-sharing games," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 815-865, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:finsto:v:21:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00780-017-0323-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00780-017-0323-9
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    Cited by:

    1. Michail Anthropelos & Constantinos Kardaras & Georgios Vichos, 2020. "Effective risk aversion in thin risk‐sharing markets," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 1565-1590, October.
    2. Koster, Maurice & Boonen, Tim J., 2019. "Constrained stochastic cost allocation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 20-30.
    3. Anthropelos, Michail & Boonen, Tim J., 2020. "Nash equilibria in optimal reinsurance bargaining," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 196-205.
    4. Tim J. Boonen & Fangda Liu & Ruodu Wang, 2021. "Competitive equilibria in a comonotone market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1217-1255, November.
    5. Wang, Ruodu & Wei, Yunran, 2020. "Characterizing optimal allocations in quantile-based risk sharing," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 288-300.
    6. Maxim Bichuch & Zachary Feinstein, 2020. "Endogenous inverse demand functions," Papers 2012.08002, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Risk sharing; Heterogeneous beliefs; Reporting of beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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