Property rights and the evolution of the state
AbstractUsing property-rights tools, this paper develops a theory of the transition from despotic to rule-of-law regimes, relying on the notion that rulers and subjects are interested in maximizing wealth. Keeping subjects in check enhances despots' internal security, but at the cost of lower output, and of less wealth for the despots. Enhanced wealth is especially valuable for protection against outside threat. Subjects will increase output only if provided with rights to, for example, ownership, movement, and voting. Despots can guarantee them these rights by relinquishing some of their own power. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.
Volume (Year): 1 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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