Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Withholding Of Knowledge In Organizations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Matthias Kräkel

Abstract

This paper examines a principal’s trade-off when he decides whether to transfer knowledge to other members of the organization. Although knowledge makes an agent more productive (productivity effect), knowledge transfer could cause the agent to become selfemployed. The agent would then become a strong competitor of the principal (competition effect). I show that there is also an effort effect, which determines the principal’s optimal knowledge transfer and his preference for either a principal-agent relationship or a duopolistic competition with the agent. The principal’s decision depends crucially on whether knowledge transfer leads only to a relative competitive advantage for the agent, or additionally to an absolute advantage when the agent becomes self-employed. I also show that teamwork makes a principal-agent relationship more attractive for the principal and that such effort sharing leads to lower costs.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.vhb.de/sbr/pdfarchive.html
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by LMU Munich School of Management in its journal Schmalenbach Business Review.

Volume (Year): 54 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 221-242

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:54:y:2002:i:3:p:221-242

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Muenchen
Phone: 0049 89 2180 2166
Fax: 0049 89 2180 6327
Web page: http://www.sbr-online.com
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:54:y:2002:i:3:p:221-242. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (sbr) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask sbr to update the entry or send us the correct address.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.