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Towards a Testbed for Modelling Application Service Provider (ASP)

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  • Manish Agarwal
  • R. Kishore
  • H.R. Rao
  • S. Upadhyaya

Abstract

The information system outsourcing arena has recently seen the introduction of a new player – the Application Service Provider (ASP). ASPs are third-party companies that rent commonly available packaged software applications and related services. The model offers certain important characteristics that could result in important advantages to users. Some of these include: firms get access to world-class applications offering the same set of features as used by larger rivals, software developers are assured a recurring stream of revenue from their software products and upgrades, users are protected from the tribulations of upgrading and maintaining their software and applications. In this paper, we examine the emerging ASP model of providing software services to organisations. We then suggest a classification scheme for potential online ASP marketplaces and work on building a testable prototype for these marketplaces. We will use this testbed to study the influence of different attributes of clients and vendors on the services provided on the marketplaces. The testbed can also help in developing deception-free protocols for the interactions of the marketplace with service providers. In an environment where marketplaces provide trust-mechanisms for service-delivery, it is necessary for the marketplace to ensure that service providers have the appropriate incentives and penalties to truthfully reveal their capabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Manish Agarwal & R. Kishore & H.R. Rao & S. Upadhyaya, 2001. "Towards a Testbed for Modelling Application Service Provider (ASP)," Vision, , vol. 5(1), pages 13-23, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:vision:v:5:y:2001:i:1:p:13-23
    DOI: 10.1177/097226290100500102
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