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Information, Intermediaries and Sales Strategy in an Urban Housing Market: The Implications of Real Estate Auctions in Melbourne

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  • Chris Maher

    (Department of Geography, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria-3168, Australia)

Abstract

The influence of groups such as real estate agents on the operation of local housing markets has been a consistent theme in urban studies. In Melbourne, an increasing incidence of property sales by means of open auctions is the result of a sustained campaign by the real estate industry. Such sales have substantial benefits for the agents and alter many of the strategies for buying adopted by both buyer and seller. However, it is apparent that there are a number of unintended impacts including making the purchase of housing more difficult or risky for some groups. The practice of auctioning is seen to be an active element in determining housing access and the basis for social change within neighbourhoods subject to a high incidence at auctions. Thus the actions of agents can be seen to have far reaching effects in terms of the socio-spatial outcomes of the housing market.

Suggested Citation

  • Chris Maher, 1989. "Information, Intermediaries and Sales Strategy in an Urban Housing Market: The Implications of Real Estate Auctions in Melbourne," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 26(5), pages 495-509, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:26:y:1989:i:5:p:495-509
    DOI: 10.1080/00420988920080561
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    2. Ian R. Harper, 1986. "Why Financial Deregulation?," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 19(1), pages 37-49, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher J. Meyer, 1993. "Assessing the performance of real estate auctions," Working Papers 93-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    2. Alison Watts, 2016. "Auctions Versus Private Negotiations in Buyer-Seller Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-14, August.
    3. Lozano-Gracia, Nancy & Young, Cheryl & Lall, Somik V. & Vishwanath, Tara, 2013. "Leveraging land to enable urban transformation : lessons from global experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6312, The World Bank.
    4. Christopher J. Mayer, 1993. "A model of real estate auctions versus negotiated sales," Working Papers 93-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

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