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An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change

Author

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  • Robert Harmel
  • Kenneth Janda

Abstract

The authors present a theory that seeks to explain why parties change their political strategies, organizational characteristics and issue positions. Whereas most of the existing literature on party change deals with party systems, the focus here is on individual parties. Whereas much of the literature views parties as responding more or less gradually to socioeconomic change, change is here regarded as a discontinuous outcome of specific party decisions linked to party goals. This approach is placed in the literature by reviewing extant theories of party change. Our theory itself is initially advanced in a discursive section which suggests that change does not `just happen', but instead results from leadership change, a change of dominant faction within the party, and/or an external stimulus for change. The article then presents a more formal exposition of this theory, consisting of definitions, assumptions, and a series of testable propositions. It concludes with illustrative examples of this theoretical framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Harmel & Kenneth Janda, 1994. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 259-287, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:259-287
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006003001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bruce, John M. & Clark, John A. & Kessel, John H., 1991. "Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1089-1105, December.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hyytinen, Ari & Merilã„Inen, Jaakko & Saarimaa, Tuukka & Toivanen, Otto & Tukiainen, Janne, 2018. "Public Employees as Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 68-81, February.
    2. Gert-Jan Put & Steven Van Hecke & Corey Cunningham & Wouter Wolfs, 2016. "The Choice of Spitzenkandidaten: A Comparative Analysis of the Europarties’ Selection Procedures," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 4(1), pages 9-22.
    3. repec:gig:joupla:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:109-136 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Meriläinen, Jaakko & Tukiainen, Janne, 2016. "Primary Effect in Open-List Elections," Working Papers 79, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Jaakko Meriläinen & Janne Tukiainen, 2018. "Rank effects in political promotions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 87-109, October.
    6. Emilie Van Haute & Jean-Benoît Pilet, 2007. "Opening and Democratizing Pilar Parties? Internal reforms in Belgian political parties," Cahiers du CEVIPOL/Brussels Working papers 44258, Centre d'étude de la vie politique (CEVIPOL) of the Université Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. Emilie Van Haute & Jean-Benoît Pilet, 2007. "Opening and Democratizing Pilar Parties? Internal reforms in Belgian political parties," CEVIPOL Working Papers 2007/1, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. repec:ulb:ulbcvp:p0004 is not listed on IDEAS

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