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Sequential Elections and Retrospective Voting

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  • Kenneth C. Williams

Abstract

Retrospective considerations do influence vote choice. But the manner in which voters incorporate retrospective evaluations is still an empirical question. This essay compares two voting rules: a traditional retrospective rule and a retrospective-prospective rule. The rules are differentiated based on the information costs associated with each. It is assumed that the traditional retrospective rule is less costly since voters need only make evaluations about the incumbent, whereas using a retrospective-prospective rule, voters must acquire additional information about the challenger. This essay argues that a choice of voting rule is a function of whether voters perceive the electoral environment as being stable or unstable (in terms of the issue positions candidates adopt over time). Laboratory experiments are conducted to test this proposition. In general, the results show that voters show a greater tendency to rely on a traditional retrospective rule when they perceive a stable electoral environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth C. Williams, 1994. "Sequential Elections and Retrospective Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(2), pages 239-255, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:239-255
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006002005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Davis, Douglas D. & Holt, Charles a., 1993. "Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 8(2), pages 179-212.
    2. Kenneth Collier & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams, 1989. "The rationally uninformed electorate: Some experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 3-29, January.
    3. Kenneth Collier & Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams, 1987. "Retrospective voting: An experimental study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 101-130, January.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    5. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), 2013. "Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12964.

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