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Who wins preference votes? An analysis of party loyalty, ideology, and accountability to voters

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  • Olle Folke
  • Johanna Rickne

Abstract

We study the distribution of preference votes across politicians with different behaviors and attitudes. There are two main findings. First, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more active in communicating their policy proposals and policy priorities. This suggests that preference voting may incentivize more transparency and communication among politicians, and, hence, be positive for accountability. Second, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more—not less—loyal to the party in their voting decisions, and to politicians who’s ideological and policy positions are mainstream—rather than extreme—compared to their party colleagues. Together with the first finding, this suggests that preference voting can strengthen the bond of accountability between voters and politicians without undercutting parties’ ideological cohesion.

Suggested Citation

  • Olle Folke & Johanna Rickne, 2020. "Who wins preference votes? An analysis of party loyalty, ideology, and accountability to voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(1), pages 11-35, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:1:p:11-35
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simona Piattoni & Matteo Fabio Nels Giglioli, 2020. "Does Changing Electoral Systems Affect (Corrupt) Particularistic Exchanges? Evidence from the Italian Case," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(2), pages 78-91.

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