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Nonsymmetry and Core Size in N-Person Sidepayment Games

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Listed:
  • H. Andrew Michener

    (Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin—Madison)

  • Kenneth Yuen

    (Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin—Madison)

  • Stephen B. Geisheker

    (Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin—Madison)

Abstract

This article presents a procedure for indexing n-person cooperative games in terms of degree of nonsymmetry. This ordinal-level index is limited to sidepayment games, but applies generally to games of three or more players. To validate the index, a laboratory experiment was conducted with four-person games differing in degree of nonsymmetry and in core size. The results show that, while core size had no significant effects, the players' payoffs varied significantly as a function of nonsymmetry. Strong players received increasingly more and weak players received increasingly less as nonsymmetry increased. Tests for goodness of fit of several prominent solution concepts show that, across experimental treatments, the Shapley value predicts better than other solutions. Shapley is followed in order by the disruption nucleolus, the nucleolus, and finally the equality solution. These tests also show that all of the theories decline in predictive accuracy as the degree of nonsymmetry increases. Reasons for this trend are discussed in terms of predictive patterns and payoff variances.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Andrew Michener & Kenneth Yuen & Stephen B. Geisheker, 1980. "Nonsymmetry and Core Size in N-Person Sidepayment Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 495-523, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:24:y:1980:i:3:p:495-523
    DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400306
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gately, Dermot, 1974. "Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 195-208, February.
    2. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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