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An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person Cooperative Nonsidepayment Game

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  • Janet E. Berl

    (School of Urban and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University)

  • Richard D. McKelvey

    (School of Urban and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University)

  • Peter C. Ordeshook

    (Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences Stanford University)

  • Mark D. Winer

    (School of Urban and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University)

Abstract

This essay reports on seventeen experiments that test the validity of the Core as a solution to n-person cooperative games in a nontransferable utility context. Money is used to induce preferences, but subjects are not permitted to negotiate about nor transfer money amongst themselves. Instead, using majority rule, subjects must negotiate over and choose some policy in a two-dimensional “issue†space. Five 5-person games are run in which the subjects' utility is a function of the Euclidean distance from their ideal policy. Twelve 3-person games are run using a city-block representation of preferences. Both series of experiments strongly support the Core as a solution concept when it exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Janet E. Berl & Richard D. McKelvey & Peter C. Ordeshook & Mark D. Winer, 1976. "An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person Cooperative Nonsidepayment Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 20(3), pages 453-479, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:20:y:1976:i:3:p:453-479
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277602000304
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wilson, Robert, 1971. "Stable coalition proposals in majority-rule voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 254-271, September.
    2. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
    3. Riker, William H. & Zavoina, William James, 1970. "Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three Person Game," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 48-60, March.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    5. Judith Sloss, 1973. "Stable outcomes in majority rule voting games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 19-48, June.
    6. Wendell, Richard E & Thorson, Stuart J, 1974. "Some Generalizations of Social Decisions under Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(5), pages 893-912, September.
    7. Riker, William H., 1967. "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 642-656, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook, 1980. "Vote trading: An experimental study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 151-184, January.
    2. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. repec:pri:cepsud:111palfrey is not listed on IDEAS

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