IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ilrrev/v63y2010i4p719-736.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations in Argentina

Author

Listed:
  • Lucas Ronconi

Abstract

The author analyzes the effect of government enforcement on compliance with labor regulations in Argentina, a country where only half of the workforce receives all the benefits to which they are legally entitled. Constructing panel data for the period 1995–2002 across provinces and using the number of labor inspectors per capita as a proxy for enforcement, he estimates the effect of enforcement on compliance with six employment and social security regulations: minimum wage, maximum hours, paid vacation time, annual extra monthly wage, workers compensation insurance, and health insurance. Because of potential simultaneity between enforcement and compliance, the author explores instrumenting enforcement by electoral years. Two-stage least squares estimates suggest enforcement increases compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucas Ronconi, 2010. "Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations in Argentina," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(4), pages 719-736, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:63:y:2010:i:4:p:719-736
    DOI: 10.1177/001979391006300409
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/001979391006300409
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/001979391006300409?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gray, Wayne B & Jones, Carol Adaire, 1991. "Are OSHA Health Inspections Effective? A Longitudinal Study in the Manufacturing Sector," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(3), pages 504-508, August.
    2. Antonio Spilimbergo & Gordon H. Hanson, 1999. "Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1337-1357, December.
    3. Blakemore, Arthur E & Burgess, Paul L & Low, Stuart A & St Louis, Robert D, 1996. "Employer Tax Evasion in the Unemployment Insurance Program," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 210-230, April.
    4. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Schumann, Paul L, 1982. "Compliance with the Overtime Pay Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 159-181, April.
    5. Flanagan, Robert J, 1989. "Compliance and Enforcement Decisions under the National Labor Relations Act," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 257-280, July.
    6. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
    7. Loayza, Norman V., 1996. "The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some empirical evidence from Latin America," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 129-162, December.
    8. Michael P. Murray, 2006. "Avoiding Invalid Instruments and Coping with Weak Instruments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 111-132, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Almeida, Rita & Carneiro, Pedro, 2006. "Enforcement of Regulation, Informal Labour, Firm Size and Firm Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 5976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Almeida, Rita K. & Carneiro, Pedro, 2005. "Enforcement of Regulation, Informal Labor and Firm Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 1759, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Gathmann, Christina, 2008. "Effects of enforcement on illegal markets: Evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1926-1941, October.
    4. Guilhem Bascle, 2008. "Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic management research," Post-Print hal-00576795, HAL.
    5. Almeida, Rita & Carneiro, Pedro, 2009. "Enforcement of labor regulation and firm size," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 28-46, March.
    6. Maiga, Adam S., 2014. "Assessing self-selection and endogeneity issues in the relation between activity-based costing and performance," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 251-262.
    7. Hanson, Andrew, 2009. "Local employment, poverty, and property value effects of geographically-targeted tax incentives: An instrumental variables approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 721-731, November.
    8. Andrew Hanson & Shawn Rohlin, 2011. "The Effect of Location-Based Tax Incentives on Establishment Location and Employment across Industry Sectors," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(2), pages 195-225, March.
    9. Richard A. Ashley & Guo Li, 2013. "Re-Examining the Impact of Housing Wealth and Stock Wealth on Household Spending: Does Persistence in Wealth Changes Matter?," Working Papers e07-39, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Almén, Daniel & Nordin, Martin, 2011. "Long term unemployment and violent crimes - using post-2000 data to reinvestigate the relationship between unemployment and crime," Working Papers 2011:34, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    11. Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2019. "Heterogeneous effects of imperfectly enforced minimum wages in low-wage labor markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 355-374.
    12. Almeida, Rita & Carneiro, Pedro, 2005. "Enforcement of labor regulation, informal labor, and firm performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3756, The World Bank.
    13. Sean Muller, 2012. "Econometric methods and Reichenbach's principle," SALDRU Working Papers 85, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
    14. Maurice J.G. Bun, 2014. "Identifying the impact of deterrence on crime - internal versus external instruments," UvA-Econometrics Working Papers 14-03, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Dept. of Econometrics.
    15. Martin Nordin & Daniel Almén, 2017. "Long-term unemployment and violent crime," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, February.
    16. Roberto Coronado & Pia M. Orrenius, 2003. "The Effect of Undocumented Immigration and Border Enforcement on Crime Rates along the U.S.-Mexico Border," Working Papers 0303, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    17. Laura I. Langbein, 1994. "Estimating the Impact of Regulatory Program Enforcement," Evaluation Review, , vol. 18(5), pages 543-573, October.
    18. Huber, Martin, 2012. "Statistical verification of a natural "natural experiment": Tests and sensitivity checks for the sibling sex ratio instrument," Economics Working Paper Series 1219, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    19. repec:pra:mprapa:10841 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Raphael, Steven & Winter-Ember, Rudolf, 2001. "Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 259-283, April.
    21. Jean-Louis Arcand & Linguère M'Baye, 2013. "Braving the waves: the role of time and risk preferences in illegal migration from Senegal," CERDI Working papers halshs-00855937, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:63:y:2010:i:4:p:719-736. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.ilr.cornell.edu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.