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Stewardship Theory of Corporate Governance and Value System: The Case of a Family-owned Business Group in India

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  • S. Subramanian

Abstract

Stewardship theory of corporate governance is a normative alternative to agency theory. This article argues that the stewardship behaviour of managers results in exemplary corporate governance practices when the espoused values of the firm are aligned with the enacted values. The case study method is used to prove this argument by studying corporate governance practices in a family-owned business group in India. The Murugappa Group is a 100-year-old family-owned business group, known for their ethical practices and currently managed by the fourth-generation family members, without undergoing any split. The espoused as well enacted values of the group are studied and corporate governance practices of the group firms analysed in this article. The article focuses on the governance structure of the group, its succession planning practices and the ownership structure. The analysis indicates that aligning the enacted values with the espoused value helped the group to adapt itself to the changing external economic environment and continue creating shareholder value, the essence of corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Subramanian, 2018. "Stewardship Theory of Corporate Governance and Value System: The Case of a Family-owned Business Group in India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 11(1), pages 88-102, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ijcgvn:v:11:y:2018:i:1:p:88-102
    DOI: 10.1177/0974686218776026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    5. Islam, Nazrul & Wang, Qidong & Marinakis, Yorgos & Walsh, Steven, 2022. "Family enterprise and technological innovation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 208-221.

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