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Perceptions of Stakeholders on the ‘Redraftability’ of Construction Contracts

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  • Murali Jagannathan
  • Venkata Santosh Kumar Delhi

Abstract

Disputes in construction projects have become an integral part of the construction process. In addition to reducing their productivity, disputes create mistrust between the involved parties. A variety of reasons that contribute to the occurrence of disputes in construction projects have been discussed in the literature. One among them is the nature of the construction contract that exists between the parties. A review of the existing literature brings to the fore two schools of thought regarding the drafting of construction contracts. While the traditional school considers the contract as those documents that contain inherent incompleteness and hence prone to disputes, the liberal school believes that construction contracts can be drafted in an efficient manner to prevent disputes. In this exploratory research, we conducted semi-structured open-ended interviews with experts in contractual decision making and contract drafting in construction organizations to understand their perspective on contract drafting/redrafting process and to classify them under the respective school of thought. The study reveals some interesting insights about the perceptions and motivations of the contract drafters and the senior management of construction organizations in India, when it comes to drafting dispute-free equitable contract documents. We believe that the findings of our study will pave the way for further research in drafting efficient construction contracts that can be practicable and dispute-resistant in the Indian context.

Suggested Citation

  • Murali Jagannathan & Venkata Santosh Kumar Delhi, 2020. "Perceptions of Stakeholders on the ‘Redraftability’ of Construction Contracts," IIM Kozhikode Society & Management Review, , vol. 9(2), pages 152-161, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:iimkoz:v:9:y:2020:i:2:p:152-161
    DOI: 10.1177/2277975219885285
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    References listed on IDEAS

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