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Radically Non-Ideal Climate Politics and the Obligation to at Least Vote Green

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  • Aaron Maltais

Abstract

Obligations to reduce one's green house gas emissions appear to be difficult to justify prior to large-scale collective action because an individual's emissions have virtually no impact on the environmental problem. However, I show that individuals’ emissions choices raise the question of whether or not they can be justified as fair use of what remains of a safe global emissions budget. This is true both before and after major mitigation efforts are in place. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to establish an obligation to reduce personal emissions because it appears unlikely that governments will in fact maintain safe emissions budgets. The result, I claim, is that under current conditions we lack outcome, fairness, promotional, virtue or duty based grounds for seeing personal emissions reductions as morally obligatory.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron Maltais, 2013. "Radically Non-Ideal Climate Politics and the Obligation to at Least Vote Green," Environmental Values, , vol. 22(5), pages 589-608, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:envval:v:22:y:2013:i:5:p:589-608
    DOI: 10.3197/096327113X13745164553798
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barrett, Scott, 2005. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199286096.
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