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The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon

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  • Christophe Crombez
  • Bjoern Høyland

Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the budgetary process in the European Union. We present a game-theoretical analysis and an empirical evaluation of the new annual budgetary procedure. We find that the procedure operates much like the ordinary legislative procedure, and puts the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Given the prevailing preference configuration, our empirical analysis shows that the European Parliament does not derive power from its veto right. Any voting coalition that commands a qualified majority in the Council includes a majority of the Members of the European Parliament. However, the European Parliament does derive power from its amendment and proposal rights. Furthermore, we conclude that the procedure is poorly designed and can lead to the breakdown of negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Crombez & Bjoern Høyland, 2015. "The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 67-89, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:16:y:2015:i:1:p:67-89
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116514552202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giacomo Benedetto & Bjorn Hoyland, 2007. "The EU Annual Budgetary Procedure: The Existing Rules and Proposed Reforms of the Convention and Intergovernmental Conference 2002-04," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45, pages 565-587, September.
    2. Sara Hagemann & Bjørn Høyland, 2010. "Bicameral Politics in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 811-833, September.
    3. Clinton, Joshua & Jackman, Simon & Rivers, Douglas, 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 355-370, May.
    4. Sara Hagemann & Bjørn Høyland, 2010. "Bicameral Politics in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48, pages 811-833, September.
    5. Benedetto, Giacomo, 2013. "The EU budget after Lisbon: rigidity and reduced spending?," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 345-369, December.
    6. Luisa Giuriato, 2009. "Reforming the EU Budgetary Procedure: Is Codecision a Step Forward?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 55(1), pages 57-93, March.
    7. Giacomo Benedetto & Bjorn Hoyland, 2007. "The EU Annual Budgetary Procedure: The Existing Rules and Proposed Reforms of the Convention and Intergovernmental Conference 2002–04," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 565-587, September.
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