Reforming the EU budgetary procedure: is Codecision a step forward?
AbstractCodecision is the main EU legislative procedure and the 2007 Reform Treaty draft has adopted it to improve the budgetary process. However, at close examination, codecision and the current budgetary process show an identical structure. Both are designed as non-cooperative alternating offers bargaining games between institutions and both, although in different measure, have gone through periods of interinstitutional deadlocks and conflicts, which can be ascribed to the insufficiency of the non-cooperative bargaining setup with respect to the task of providing for joint decision making by the Parliament and the Council of Ministers: in particular, the opportunistic interpretation of the Treaty provisions by the Parliament in the 1980s was one of the consequences of the strict bargaining design. The lacking elements for joint decision-making have been gradually inserted in the procedures by means of informal negotiation institutions, which are not only mechanisms for equilibrium selection but also corrective devices to strict non-cooperative procedures. In the change from the current budgetary procedure to the one designed in the Reform Treaty, the Parliament does not seem to gain a formal â€˜dominant positionâ€™, whereas the Commission improves its scope for action and the Council consolidates its role.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 114.
Date of creation: Jul 2008
Date of revision:
EUâ€™s finances; legislative codecision; budgetary procedure; 2007 Reform Treaty.;
Other versions of this item:
- Luisa Giuriato, 2009. "Reforming the EU Budgetary Procedure: Is Codecision a Step Forward?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(1), pages 57-93, March.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999.
"Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
- Stein, Ernesto & Hommes, Rudolf & Hausmann, Ricardo & Alesina, Alberto, 1999. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," Scholarly Articles 4553021, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Ricardo Hausmann & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto Stein, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 5586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ricardo Hausmann & Alberto Alesina & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto H. Stein, 1998. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," Research Department Publications 4160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2004.
"The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1347, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
- Napel, Stefan & Widgren, Mika, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- repec:fth:eeccco:96 is not listed on IDEAS
- Henrik Enderlein & Johannes Lindner & Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Raymond Ritter, 2005.
"The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?,"
Occasional Paper Series
27, European Central Bank.
- Henrik Enderlein & Johannes Lindner & Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Raymond Ritter, 2005. "The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?," Public Economics 0509005, EconWPA.
- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee," CESifo Working Paper Series 1029, CESifo Group Munich.
- Vangerven, Pieterjan & Crombez, Christophe, 2012. "Spatial models of European Union politics," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/368370, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Crombez, Christophe & Høyland, Bjørn, 2012. "The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the treaty of Lisbon," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/368363, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luisa Giuriato).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.