IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v18y2017i3p339-361.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Underneath the culture of consensus: Transparency, credible commitments and voting in the Council of Ministers

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Finke

Abstract

The Council of Ministers rarely records negative individual votes, much less rejected proposals. The literature explains this high level of support by the Council’s ‘culture of consensus’ and the few negative votes are explained as signalling to the domestic audience. I introduce an alternative explanation for ministers’ explicit disagreement: during the negotiations preceding the final vote, ministers issue veto threats. To remain credible in the future, they must be prepared to carry through with their threats if their demands are not met. To test this argument, I specify domestic level conditions that enable the minister to issue credible, strategic threats in the first place. Furthermore, I introduce domestic level scrutiny as a proxy for the transparency of EU level negotiations. I find that the effect of strategic threats is strong for those cases which are not under domestic level scrutiny (low transparency). By contrast, I find no effect of strategic threats for cases which are under domestic level scrutiny (high transparency).

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Finke, 2017. "Underneath the culture of consensus: Transparency, credible commitments and voting in the Council of Ministers," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(3), pages 339-361, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:18:y:2017:i:3:p:339-361
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116517709972
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116517709972
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116517709972?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stéphanie Novak, 2013. "The Silence of Ministers: Consensus and Blame Avoidance in the Council of the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(6), pages 1091-1107, November.
    2. Madeleine O. Hosli & Mikko Mattila & Marc Uriot, 2011. "Voting in the Council of the European Union after the 2004 Enlargement: A Comparison of Old and New Member States," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(6), pages 1249-1270, November.
    3. Stasavage, David, 2004. "Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(4), pages 667-703, October.
    4. Stefanie Bailer & Mikko Mattila & Gerald Schneider, 2015. "Money Makes the EU Go Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in the Council of Ministers," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 437-456, May.
    5. Fiona Hayes‐Renshaw & Wim Van Aken & Helen Wallace, 2006. "When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 161-194, March.
    6. Gerald Schneider & Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2010. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58, pages 85-103, February.
    7. Sara Hagemann & Bjørn Høyland, 2010. "Bicameral Politics in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 811-833, September.
    8. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    9. Hug, Simon & König, Thomas, 2002. "In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 447-476, April.
    10. Gerald Schneider & Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2010. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game‐Theoretic Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 85-103, February.
    11. Sara Hagemann & Bjørn Høyland, 2010. "Bicameral Politics in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48, pages 811-833, September.
    12. Stratmann, Thomas, 2000. "Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(3), pages 665-676, September.
    13. Jonas Tallberg, 2004. "The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 999-1022, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jeffry Frieden & Stefanie Walter, 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 134-151, March.
    2. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
    3. Rory Costello & Robert Thomson, 2011. "The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs’ impact on decision outcomes in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 337-357, September.
    4. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2012. "Party ideology and legislative agendas: Estimating contextual policy positions for the study of EU decision-making," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 604-625, December.
    5. Kira Killermann, 2016. "Loose Ties or Strong Bonds? The Effect of a Commissioner's Nationality and Partisanship on Voting in the Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(6), pages 1367-1383, November.
    6. Maximilian Haag, 2022. "Bargaining power in informal trilogues: Intra-institutional preference cohesion and inter-institutional bargaining success," European Union Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 330-350, June.
    7. Narisong Huhe & Daniel Naurin & Robert Thomson, 2018. "The evolution of political networks: Evidence from the Council of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(1), pages 25-51, March.
    8. Nicola Maaser & Alexander Mayer, 2016. "Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 213-237, January.
    9. Tobias Böhmelt & Tina Freyburg, 2013. "The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states’ compliance with the acquis communautaire, 1998–2009," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 250-272, June.
    10. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2013. "Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 345-365, September.
    11. Martijn Huysmans, 2018. "Heterogeneity, Vetoes, and Exit Clauses in Federal Systems," CESifo Working Paper Series 7178, CESifo.
    12. Andreas Warntjen, 2012. "Measuring salience in EU legislative politics," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 168-182, March.
    13. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
    14. Benjamin Martill & Uta Staiger, 2021. "Negotiating Brexit: The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 261-277, March.
    15. Brigitte Pircher & Mike Farjam, 2021. "Oppositional voting in the Council of the EU between 2010 and 2019: Evidence for differentiated politicisation," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 472-494, September.
    16. M. Huysmans, 2018. "Enlargement and Exit:: The Origins of Article 50," Working Papers 18-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
    17. Muhlbock, Monika & Tosun, Jale, 2015. "Deciding over controversial issues: Voting behavior in the Council and the European Parliament on genetically modified organisms," GMCC-15: Seventh GMCC, November 17-20, 2015, Amsterdam, the Netherlands 211480, International Conference on Coexistence between Genetically Modified (GM) and non-GM based Agricultural Supply Chains (GMCC).
    18. Vibeke Wøien Hansen, 2014. "Incomplete information and bargaining in the EU: An explanation of first-reading non-agreements," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(4), pages 472-495, December.
    19. Martijn Huysmans, 2019. "Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 155-175, June.
    20. Fabio Wasserfallen & Dirk Leuffen & Zdenek Kudrna & Hanno Degner, 2019. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 3-23, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:18:y:2017:i:3:p:339-361. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.