IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v15y2014i1p43-58.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Testing models of legislative decision-making with measurement error: The robust predictive power of bargaining models over procedural models

Author

Listed:
  • Justin Leinaweaver
  • Robert Thomson

Abstract

Previous studies found that models emphasising legislative procedures make less accurate predictions of decision outcomes in the EU than the compromise model, a computationally simple variant of the Nash Bargaining Solution. In this journal, Slapin (2014) argues that this and other findings may be the result of measurement error. While acknowledging the importance of measurement error, we disagree with several assumptions in Slapin’s analysis, and show that his results are driven by an unrealistic assumption about how policy preferences are distributed among EU decision makers. We construct simulated data that more accurately reflect the distributions of policy preferences found in existing empirical evidence and suggested by theory, and demonstrate that measurement error is unlikely to have biased previous findings. If real-world decision-making took place according to the procedural model, then it would have made the most accurate predictions, even with data containing large amounts of measurement error. While this strengthens our confidence in previous studies’ findings, we explain why we should not discard procedural models.

Suggested Citation

  • Justin Leinaweaver & Robert Thomson, 2014. "Testing models of legislative decision-making with measurement error: The robust predictive power of bargaining models over procedural models," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 43-58, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:15:y:2014:i:1:p:43-58
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116513501908
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116513501908
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116513501908?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crombez, Christophe, 1996. "Legislative Procedures in the European Community," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 199-228, April.
    2. Moravcsik, Andrew, 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 513-553, October.
    3. Tsebelis, George, 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 128-142, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Czyżewski, Andrzej & Grochowska, Reanata & Józwiak, Wojciech & Kosior, Katarzyna & Kułyk, Piotr & Mirkowska, Zofia, 2014. "Development trends in agricultural sector and policies − challenges for the future (Synthesis)," Multiannual Program Reports 206066, Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics - National Research Institute (IAFE-NRI).
    2. Zhou, Rui & Li, Johnny Siu-Hang & Tan, Ken Seng, 2015. "Modeling longevity risk transfers as Nash bargaining problems: Methodology and insights," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 460-472.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002. "More power to the European Parliament?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7760, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Thomas König & Daniel Finke, 2007. "Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 153-176, June.
    3. Thomas König & Mirja Pöter, 2001. "Examining the EU Legislative Process," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(3), pages 329-351, October.
    4. James P. Cross, 2012. "Interventions and negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 47-69, March.
    5. Christophe Crombez & Simon Hix, 2011. "Treaty reform and the Commission’s appointment and policy-making role in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 291-314, September.
    6. Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2008. "The Political Economy of the 2003 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy," LICOS Discussion Papers 21508, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    7. Torsten J. Selck, 2004. "On the Dimensionality of European Union Legislative Decision-Making," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 203-222, April.
    8. Jonathan B Slapin, 2014. "Measurement, model testing, and legislative influence in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 24-42, March.
    9. Abdul G. Noury, 2002. "Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 33-58, March.
    10. Keith Dowding, 2000. "Institutionalist Research on the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 125-144, February.
    11. Robert Pahre & Burcu Uçaray-Mangitli, 2009. "The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 357-384, March.
    12. Holger Döring, 2007. "The Composition of the College of Commissioners," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(2), pages 207-228, June.
    13. Madeleine O. Hosli & Běla Plechanovová & Serguei Kaniovski, 2018. "Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 31-52, June.
    14. Dirk Junge & Thomas König, 2007. "What's Wrong With Eu Spatial Analysis?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 465-487, October.
    15. Fabio Franchino, 2000. "The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 155-181, April.
    16. Dennis Mueller, 2005. "Constitutional political economy in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 57-73, July.
    17. Christophe Crombez, 2002. "Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 7-32, March.
    18. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    19. Frank M. Häge, 2007. "Committee Decision-making in the Council of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 299-328, September.
    20. Widgren, Mika, 2001. "Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:15:y:2014:i:1:p:43-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.