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Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program

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  • Julien A. Hanoteau

    (Groupe d’Economie Mondiale, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris)

Abstract

This paper shows empirically that the choice between auction and grandfathering for the distribution of pollution permits is not neutral in presence of political market failures as it motivates rent-seeking. We model the distribution of free permits in the US sulfur emissions trading system as an endogenous sharing rule and we test this relation using PAC contribution as a measure of political influence. We find that shareholder interests of the US power sector influenced the distribution of permits as they were motivated by a windfall gain despite profit regulation in their sector and thanks to a climate of regulatory uncertainty when the law was discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien A. Hanoteau, 2003. "Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 93(1), pages 289-314, January-F.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:289-314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Julien Bueb & Sonia Schwartz, 2011. "Strategic manipulation of a pollution permit market and international trade," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 313-331, June.
    2. Sonia Schwartz, 2009. "Comment distribuer les quotas de pollution ?. Une revue de la littérature," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(4), pages 535-568.
    3. Sanz, Nicolas & Schwartz, Sonia, 2013. "Are pollution permit markets harmful for employment?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 374-383.
    4. Yanbin Li & Zhen Li & Min Wu & Feng Zhang & Gejirifu De, 2018. "Regional-Level Allocation of CO 2 Emission Permits in China: Evidence from the Boltzmann Distribution Method," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-16, July.
    5. Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Oberndorfer, Ulrich, 2008. "Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-023, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Ashwin Rode, 2021. "Rent Seeking over Tradable Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 257-285, February.
    7. Niels Anger & Christoph Böhringer & Andreas Lange, 2015. "The political economy of energy tax differentiation across industries: theory and empirical evidence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 78-98, February.
    8. Amlendu Kumar Dubey, 2010. "Initial Allocation of Emissions Permits in the Two-Sided Matching Framework," Journal of Quantitative Economics, The Indian Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), pages 95-104, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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