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Entry, Its Deterrence, and Its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S. Photographic Film Industry

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Author Info
Vrinda Kadiyali
Abstract

This work, set in the "new empirical industrial organization" framework (Bresnahan, 1987), examines firm-level demand-based and cost-based explanations for entry and accommodation strategies in the U.S. photographic film industry. I first estimate preentry and postentry market structures. Then, using the estimated demand, cost, and market conduct parameters, I show how entry by Fuji Photo, or lack thereof by others, is a function of two market structures. I also show how market structure and conduct, and changes in them over the pre- and postentry periods, are, in turn, functions of entry, its deterrence, and it accommodation.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 452-478
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:autumn:p:452-478

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  1. Kyle Bagwell & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Game Theory and Industrial Organization," Discussion Papers 1307, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1999. "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 805-826, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2007. "Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration," NBER Working Papers 13069, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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