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Political Cycles and International Interdependence

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  • Menegatti, Mario

    ()
    (Università di Parma, Dipartimento di Economia)

Abstract

This paper studies the features of political cycles in a setting of international interdependence caused by inflation linkages. The main results are the following. Political cycles caused by domestic elections are larger than without international linkages. Political cycles caused by domestic and foreign elections have opposite effects. If elections are held simultaneously at home and abroad, the amplitude of the cycle is smaller when the winning coalition is the same and larger when the winner is different. In all cases analysed not only the amplitude but also the sign of the cycles depends on the openness of the countries examined.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Camera di Commercio di Genova in its journal Economia Internazionale / International Economics.

Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 353-365

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Handle: RePEc:ris:ecoint:0106

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Keywords: Political cycles; Elections; International interdependence;

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  1. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen, 1988. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition," Scholarly Articles 4553015, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  4. Alesina, Alberto & Cohen, Gerald D. & Roubini, Nouriel, 1993. "Electoral business cycle in industrial democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, March.
  5. Lohmann, Susanne, 1993. "Electoral cycles and international policy cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 1373-1391, October.
  6. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
  7. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Cooper, Richard N., 1985. "Economic interdependence and coordination of economic policies," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1195-1234 Elsevier.
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