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Integración vertical y contratos gerenciales: herramientas estratégicas en mercados imperfectos

Author

Listed:
  • Flavio Jácome Liévano
  • Andrés Mejía Villa
  • Karen Mendoza Manjarrés

Abstract

Este artículo analiza un modelo de competencia a la Bertrand con bienes diferenciados, que permite determinar las decisiones óptimas de las empresas cuando los dueños pueden usar la integración vertical y los contratos gerenciales como herramientas estratégicas. En equilibrio se obtiene que: i) los dueños siempre delegan el control en un gerente y este es incentivado a ser menos agresivo en ventas; ii) cuando los bienes son casi homogéneos, no hay integración vertical; iii) el bienestar social en ningún caso es el más alto que se podría lograr.

Suggested Citation

  • Flavio Jácome Liévano & Andrés Mejía Villa & Karen Mendoza Manjarrés, 2014. "Integración vertical y contratos gerenciales: herramientas estratégicas en mercados imperfectos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 16(31), pages 127-156, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:16:y:2014:i:31:p:127-156
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/fjacome31.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Miranda Forero, Sandra Liliana & Poveda Berna, lXimena & Jácome Liévano, Flavio Hernando, 2012. "Elección estratégica de contratos forward y contratos de incentivos gerenciales en un contexto de competencia a la Cournot," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competencia a la Bertrand; productos diferenciados; Integración vertical; contratos gerenciales; Equilibrio de Nash;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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