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Efficacité et altruisme : les sophismes de Mandeville, Smith et Pareto

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  • Serge-Christophe Kolm

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[eng] Efficience and altruism :. The Mandeville, Smith and Pareto fallacies. Serge-Christophe Kolm. Why is altruism so scarce, especially in economic life, compared to egoism, whereas most great moral Systems advocate it and condemn the lutter ? Pushing aside a few invalid answers, one meets one of the most famous ones : egoism conduces to economic efficiency. In particular, fualing a market (or planning) System, it permits the relative efficiency of a complex economy with advanced division of labour. However, sufficiently altruistic individuals can always achieve the same social productivity, by imitating a market if necessary, and they can in fact achieve a higher one. But efficiency may he impaired in intermediary situations. Pareto's global model, in which altruistic (« utility » maximizing) individuals behave egoistically (« ophelimity » maximizing) on markets, is a priori illogical. It only works if altruism is low enough or high enough. The discrimination between these two cases is explained in a companion paper (« Altruisms and Efficiencies : the Rousseau Fallacy »). [fre] Pourquoi l'altruisme est-il si rare dans les faits, surtout économiques, par rapport à l'égoïsme, alors que presque toutes les grandes morales le prônent et condam­nent le second ? Ecartant les réponses insatisfaisantes, on tombe sur l'une des plus répandues : l'égoïsme entraîne l'efficacité sociale de l'économie. Moteur d'un système de marché ou de planification hiérarchique, il permettrait le fonction­nement relativement efficace d'une économie complexe à division du travail poussée. Pourtant, des individus assez altruistes peuvent toujours réaliser cette perfor­mance, et même de meilleures. L'argument est donc erroné. Par contre, l'efficacité peut en effet être entravée dans les cas intermédiaires. L'affinement conceptuel dû à Pareto, avec sa définition de l'efficacité et de l'optimalité, et sa distinction entre utilisés et ophélimités, donne une précision équivalente à l'argument : la construction de Pareto est a priori illogique, car l'altruisme qu'il attribue aux indi­vidus devrait troubler la perfection du marché, et en recherchant comment elle pourrait ne pas l'être a posteriori, on voit qu'elle requiert qu'il y ait ou assez peu, ou beaucoup, d'altruisme. L'explication du partage entre ces deux cas est l'objet d'un autre article (« Altruismes et efficacités : le sophisme de Rousseau »).

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  • Serge-Christophe Kolm, 1981. "Efficacité et altruisme : les sophismes de Mandeville, Smith et Pareto," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 32(1), pages 5-31.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1981_num_32_1_408581
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1981.408581
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1981.408581
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    1. Winter, Sidney Jr., 1969. "A simple remark on the second optimality theorem of welfare economics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 99-103, June.
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    1. Robert Tartarin, 1987. "Efficacité et propriété," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(6), pages 1129-1156.

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