An Overview of France’s New Deposit Insurance System
Abstract[eng] Although deposit insurance schemes are theoretically redundant with capital adequacy standards, experience showed that a system combining both approaches was necessary in maintaining financial stability. Applications of regulations on the subject vary in countries concerned. As regards deposit insurance schemes however, models implementing risk related premium more effective but more costly to maintain are developing. The new French deposit insurance scheme is in line with this trend, by establishing deposit insurance premia which are based not only on deposits but also on the level of risk specific to each credit institution. The level of risk is determined by different parameters which are solvency, profitability, risk diversification and transformation. . JEL Classifications : G28
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière (English ed.).
Volume (Year): 60 (2000)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecofi
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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