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Dix ans de réforme des télécommunications au Royaume-Uni : échec du pilotage de la structure de marché et libéralisation complète

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  • Axel Thonier

Abstract

[ger] Zehn Jahre Reform der Telekommunikation im Vereinieten Kônigreich: Scheitern der Marktstruktursteuerung . und vollstandige Marktliberalisierung von Axel Thonier . Dieser Artikel untersucht die Entwicklung des Telekommunikationssektors im Vereinigten Kônigreich in den letzten zehn Jahren und versucht, einige Punkte der Bilanz aufzuzeigen, bei denen die wichtigsten Tendenzen dieser Deregulierungs- und Privatisierungsbewegung zutage treten, und zwar eine schrittweise Intensivierung des Wettbewerbs, eine starkere Tarifregulierung und eine Kopplung mit einer Privatisierung von BT. Obwohl der Versuch, die Marktstruktur zwischen 1984 und 1991 durch ein Duopol zu steuern, scheiterte, fuhrte die Reform im Vereinigten Kônigreich 1995 zu erheblichen Leistungssteigerungen, zu niedrigeren und kostenorientierten Tarifen so wie zu einem diversifizierteren Angebot. Auf europàischer Ebene gilt das OFTEL als Schrittmacher unter den nationalen Regulierungsbehôrden, die ihre jeweilige Situation im Hinblick auf den Stichtag des 1. Januar 1998, d. h. das Datum der vollstandigen Liberalisierung dieses Sektors, anzupassen haben. [spa] Diez anos de reforma de las telecomunicaciones en el Reino Unido: fracaso de la regulacion de la estructura de mercado y liberalizaciôn compléta del mercado . por Axel Thonier . Este articulo estudia la evoluciôn del sector de telecomunicaciones en el Reino Unido durante los diez ûltimos anos e intenta establecer ciertas pautas para un balance, destacando las principales tendencias de este movimiento de desregulacion y de privatization: una intensificaciôn progresiva de la competencia y una regulacion tarifaria mas fuerte que se integran a la privatizacion de BT. . A pesar del fracaso en el intento de regular la estructura de mercado a través de un duopolio entre 1984 y 1991, la experiencia britanica trae aparejada en 1995 importantes logros en términos de eficiencia, tarifas mas bajas y orientadas hacia los costos, asi como también una oferta mas diversificada. En el piano europeo, el OFTEL es considerado como precursor entre los reguladores nacionales, que tendrân que adaptar sus respectivas situaciones en vista del calendario que debe cumplirse para el lero de enero de 1998, fecha de la liberalizaciôn compléta del sector. [eng] Ten Years of Telecommunications Reform in the United Kingdom: Failure to Steer the Market Structure and . Complete Liberalization of the Market, by Axel Thonier . This article studies the development of the telecommunications sector in the United Kingdom over the last ten years. It endeavours to provide something of an assessment, highlighting the main trends of this deregulation and privatization movement: a gradual increase in competition and stronger rate regulation coupled with BT privatization. In spite of the failure to steer the market structure with a duopoly from 1984 to 1991, the British experience led to considerable efficiency gains, lower cost-related rates and a more diversified supply in 1995. At European level, OFTELis at the vanguard of national regulators who will have to adjust their respective situations by the 1 January 1998 deadline for the complete liberalization of the sector. [fre] Dix ans de réforme des télécommunications au Royaume-Uni : échec du pilotage de la structure de marché et . libéralisation complète par Axel Thonier . Cet article étudie l'évolution du secteur des télécommunications au Royaume-Uni durant les dix dernières années et tente de fournir quelques éléments de bilan, faisant ressortir les principales tendances de ce mouvement de déréglementation et de privatisation : une intensification progressive de la concurrence, une régulation tarifaire plus forte, et un couplage avec une privatisation de BT. Malgré l'échec de la tentative de piloter la structure du marché à travers un duopole entre 1984 et 1991, l'expérience britannique débouche en 1995 sur d'importants gains d'efficacité, des tarifs plus faibles et orientés vers les coûts, ainsi qu'une offre plus diversifiée. Sur le plan européen, l'OFTEL fait figure de précurseur parmi les régulateurs nationaux, qui auront à adapter leurs situations respectives en vue de l'échéance du 1er janvier 1998, date de la libéralisation complète du secteur.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Thonier, 1995. "Dix ans de réforme des télécommunications au Royaume-Uni : échec du pilotage de la structure de marché et libéralisation complète," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 119(3), pages 107-125.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1995_num_119_3_5734
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1995.5734
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1995.5734
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hunt, L C & Lynk, E L, 1990. "Divestiture of Telecommunications in the UK: A Time Series Analysis," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 52(3), pages 229-251, August.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
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