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Efektivnost obecních obchodních společností při poskytování služeb
[The effectiveness of the municipal firms in providing the services]

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  • Jan Pavel

Abstract

The paper is dealing with the problem of so called "municipal" firms. I define them as the firms, which are based on commercial law but are owned by municipalities. The municipal firms are often used for providing services in the Czech Republic. However, this type of firm is connected with a lot of problems (transparency, effectiveness). The paper is divided into five main parts. I discuss the theoretical problems, which are connected with the municipal firm in the first part. I especially focus on the question, what is the main factor of increasing the effectiveness - if the change in the ownership or the competition pressure. The second part describes the current situation in the Czech Republic and here I try to estimate, which part of public procurement market on the municipal level is controlled through the municipal firms. In the third part I have developed the model, which shows that for the municipalities can be reasonable to contract the municipal firm despite it is more expensive that classical outsourcing. Next part is dealing with the economical effectiveness of the municipal firms. The result of empirical research shows, that this type of the firm is the most expensive solution in the providing services on the municipal level. The last part, conclusion, summarise the main results and formulate the policy recommendations, which could increase the effectiveness of the public sector as well as of the economy as a whole.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Pavel, 2007. "Efektivnost obecních obchodních společností při poskytování služeb [The effectiveness of the municipal firms in providing the services]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(5), pages 681-693.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2007:y:2007:i:5:id:619:p:681-693
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.619
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
    2. Domberger, Simon & Hall, Christine & Li, Eric Ah Lik, 1995. "The Determinants of Price and Quality in Competitively Tendered Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1454-1470, November.
    3. Stefan Szymanski, 1996. "The impact of compulsory competitive tendering on refuse collection services," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 1-19, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jana Soukopová & Ivan Malý, 2013. "Competitive environment in waste management and its impact on municipal expenditures," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 1113-1119.
    2. Zdeněk Hrdlička & Jana Ištvánfyová & Leoš Vítek, 2010. "Systémy účetnictví a evidence daňových příjmů vládních institucí [The System of Accounting for Government Tax Revenues]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2010(2), pages 253-270.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    effectiveness; Czech Republic; Municipal Firms; Public Procurement; Public Services; Transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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