Vertical coordination, rent distribution, and development
AbstractVertical coordination has grown strongly in global supply chains. Local suppliers in developing countries engage in complex contracting with companies selling into high-income markets - either domestically or internationally. These contracts not only specify conditions for delivery and production processes, but also include the provision of inputs, technology, management advice etc. This paper analyzes how weak contract enforcement institutions and imperfect factor markets are affecting vertical coordination in development, and what the implications are for income creation and rent distribution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven in its series LICOS Discussion Papers with number 18407.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
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Vertical coordination; contract enforcement; development; rent distribution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
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- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
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