SÍLVIA MOURTHÉ VALADARES (Associate Chief Economist, Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, Brasilia.) RICARDO PEREIRA CÂMARA LEAL (Dean, The COPPEAD Graduate School of Business, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the structure of ownership and control of public Brazilian companies using data from 325 companies listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange. We show a high degree of ownership concentration. The major shareholder has, on average, 41 percent of the equity capital, while the five major have 61 percent. Concentration occurs mainly with voting shares with 62 percent of the companies having one shareholder with more than 50 percent of the voting shares. Actually, the violation of the one share-one vote rule with the use of non-voting shares is very common. Only 11 percent of the companies do not have non voting shares and the companies have, on average, only 54 percent of their equity capital as voting capital. We also analyze the indirect ownership structure. Pyramiding structure is not commonly used as a way of violating the one share - one vote rule. Control is maintained through more than one tier. We also show the importance of different shareholder classes. Corporations are the main investor category in the direct ownership structure while individuals are more important when indirect control is accounted for.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal ABANTE.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998.
"Law and Finance,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"Law and Finance,"
NBER Working Papers
5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)