Demographic Development and Moral Hazard: Health Insurance with Medical Savings Accounts
AbstractIn times of ever-rising health expenditures it is becoming more and more obvious that conventional models for funding health care are increasingly experiencing difficulties in meeting this challenge. The concept of Medical Savings Accounts (“MSAs”) represents an innovative and so far rarely analysed alternative for the funding of health care systems. In this concept an anticipated amount of money needed is saved up ex ante by each individual in a special account set aside to cover health care expenses. Since, however, health care expenses for certain kinds of treatment frequently exceed the financial capacity of the individual, Medical Savings Accounts are normally introduced in combination with health insurance covering defined services with higher financial risk. From a theoretical point of view the MSA concept helps to counteract the phenomenon of moral hazard in health insurance systems, at the same time coping with the future challenges posed by demographic development. This paper also examines experience gained so far in the implementation and use of Medical Savings Accounts in different countries. It draws a mixed but positive picture of the results. Therefore it could be feasible to integrate certain elements of this concept into health care systems of European countries. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2004) 29, 689–704. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0440.2004.00311.x
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance.
Volume (Year): 29 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Jonas Schreyogg, 2004. "Demographic Development and Moral Hazard: Health Insurance with Medical Savings Accounts," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, vol. 29(4), pages 689-704, October.
- Schreyögg, Jonas, 2004. "Demographic development and moral hazard: Health insurance with medical savings accounts," Discussion Papers 2004/16, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
- O2 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy
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- Jonas Schreyögg & Lim Meng Kin, 2004. "Health-Care Reforms in Singapore - Twenty Years of Medical Savings Accounts," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(3), pages 55-60, October.
- Pablo Gottret & George Schieber, 2006. "Health Financing Revisited : A Practitioner's Guide," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7094.
- Michel Grignon, 2005.
"Aging, Health and Aggregate Medical Care Spending in France,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
2005-06, McMaster University.
- Michel Grignon, 2005. "Aging, Health and Aggregate Medical Care Spending in France," Department of Economics Working Papers 2005-05, McMaster University.
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