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Acción colectiva, regímenes políticos y crecimiento económico: hacia una discusión teórica

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  • Luis Felipe Zegarra B.

Abstract

No son pocos quienes opinan que la ausencia de debate y negociación es favorable al crecimiento económico, puesto que permite la aplicación de medidas económicas sin tomar en cuenta los intereses de ciertos grupos de presión. En este documento tratamos de demostrar que la realidad es totalmente contraria. Para ello, discutimos teóricamente cómo la producción de las reglas de juego es afectada por las características del mercado político, en particular por la acción colectiva y por la naturaleza del régimen político. Sobre la base de este análisis, concluimos que las reglas de juego son favorables al crecimiento económico si los costos de transacción por conformar una agrupación son despreciables, si las agrupaciones congregan a vastos sectores de la sociedad y cuentan con adecuados mecanismos de rendición de cuentas, y si el poder político no se encuentra concentrado.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Felipe Zegarra B., 2000. "Acción colectiva, regímenes políticos y crecimiento económico: hacia una discusión teórica," Apuntes. Revista de ciencias sociales, Fondo Editorial, Universidad del Pacífico, vol. 27(46), pages 5-28.
    • Handle: RePEc:pai:apunup:es-46-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hayek, F. A., 1978. "Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226320861, September.
    2. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 51-69, Summer.
    3. Hayek, F. A., 1978. "Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226320830, September.
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