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Managing Government Exposure to Private Infrastructure Risks

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  • Irwin, Timothy
  • Klein, Michael
  • Perry, Guillermo E.
  • Thobani, Mateen

Abstract

The privatization of infrastructure should lead to the development of new infrastructure, improvements in the operation of existing infrastructure, and a reduction in budgetary subsidies. Whether countries reap the full benefits of privatization, however, depends on how risks are allocated. If as is often the case in developing countries, governments assume risks that should be borne by investors, they may reduce incentives for efficiency and incur significant liabilities. To solve these problems, governments need to improve their policies and restrict their risk bearing to certain political and regulatory risks over which they have direct control. When a government provides guarantees, it should attempt to measure their cost and improve the way they are handled in the accounts and budgets. Measurement and budgeting are critical to improving decisions about the provision of guarantees, to improving project selection and contract design, and to protecting governments from unknowingly entering into commitments that might jeopardize future budgets. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Irwin, Timothy & Klein, Michael & Perry, Guillermo E. & Thobani, Mateen, 1999. "Managing Government Exposure to Private Infrastructure Risks," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 14(2), pages 229-245, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:wbrobs:v:14:y:1999:i:2:p:229-45
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Eric C., 2002. "Public infrastructure and economic growth: a new approach applied to East Asian economies," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 411-435, August.
    2. Beckers, Thorsten & Miksch, Jan, 2002. "Die Allokation des Verkehrsmengenrisikos bei Betreibermodellen für Straßeninfrastruktur: Theoretische Grundlagen und Anwendung auf das A-Modell," Discussion Papers 2002/10, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Jean Shaoul & Anne Stafford & Pam Stapleton, 2010. "Financial black holes," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 23(2), pages 229-255, February.
    4. Patel, Urjit R. & Bhattacharya, Saugata, 2010. "Infrastructure in India: The economics of transition from public to private provision," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 52-70, March.
    5. Carlos Contreras & Julio Angulo, 2017. "Valuing Governmental Support in Road PPPs," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 223(4), pages 37-66, December.

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