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Ending "Too Big To Fail": Government Promises Versus Investor Perceptions

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  • Todd A. Gormley
  • Simon Johnson
  • Changyong Rhee

Abstract

Can a government credibly promise not to bailout firms whose failure would have major negative systemic consequences? Our analysis of Korea’s 1997–98 crisis suggests an answer: No. Despite a general "no bailout" policy during the crisis, the largest Korean corporate groups—facing severe financial and governance problems—could still borrow heavily from households by issuing bonds at prices implying very low expected default risk. The evidence suggests "too big to fail" beliefs were not eliminated by government promises because investors believed that this policy was not time consistent. Subsequent bailouts confirmed the market view that creditors would be protected.

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  • Todd A. Gormley & Simon Johnson & Changyong Rhee, 2015. "Ending "Too Big To Fail": Government Promises Versus Investor Perceptions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(2), pages 491-518.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:19:y:2015:i:2:p:491-518.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfu015
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    Cited by:

    1. Chirinko, Robert, 2023. "What went wrong? The Puerto Rican debt crisis, the “Treasury Put,” and the failure of market discipline," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Ducret, Romain, 2021. "Investors' perception of business group membership during an economic crisis : Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic," FSES Working Papers 524, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    3. Ducret, Romain & Isakov, Dušan, 2023. "Business group heterogeneity and firm outcomes: Evidence from Korean chaebols," FSES Working Papers 531, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    4. Dong, Yi & Hou, Qiannan & Ni, Chenkai, 2021. "Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Viswanathan Nagarajan & Pitabas Mohanty & Apalak Khatua, 2023. "Financing effects of corporate diversification: A review," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(7), pages 2555-2585, October.
    6. Ducret, Romain & Isakov, Dušan, 2020. "The Korea discount and chaebols," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Attaoui, Sami & Poncet, Patrice, 2015. "Write-Down Bonds and Capital and Debt Structures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 97-119.
    8. Vo, Hong & Phan, Anh & Trinh, Quoc-Dat & Vu, Linh Nhat, 2022. "Does economic policy uncertainty affect trade credit and firm value in Korea? A comparison of chaebol vs. non-chaebol firms," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 474-491.
    9. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2017. "East Asian Financial and Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 23845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Bereskin, Frederick L. & Kim, Bushik & Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2015. "Do credit rating concerns lead to better corporate governance? Evidence from Korea," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PB), pages 592-608.
    11. Gao, Haoyu & Ru, Hong & Tang, Dragon Yongjun, 2021. "Subnational debt of China: The politics-finance nexus," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 881-895.

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