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Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence

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  • Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the axiomatic foundation of the theory of choice. Describing a choice procedure which one often observes in real life, this paper shows that the requirement of path independence of such a procedure is a necessary and sufficient condition for transitive or full rationalization of a choice function, i.e. the existence of a preference ordering. It is shown that our result holds when rationality is identified with different interpretations of the binary relations of preference revealed by a choice function, e.g. the revealed preference relation of Arrow, the wide revealed preference relation of Richter. It is also shown that a weaker version of our path independence condition is both necessary and sufficient for a rational choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Taradas Bandyopadhyay, 1988. "Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(2), pages 343-351.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:2:p:343-351.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297585
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas & Sengupta, Kunal, 1999. "The Congruence Axiom and Path Independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 254-266, July.
    2. Taradas Bandyopadhyay, 2011. "Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 597-608, October.
    3. He, Junnan, 2012. "On the Necessity of Pairs and Triplets for the Equivalence between Rationality Axioms," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 6, pages 1-15.
    4. He, Junnan, 2011. "A Generalization of Sen’s Unification Theorem: Avoiding the Necessity of Pairs and Triplets," MPRA Paper 37094, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Taradas Bandyopadhyay & Kunal Sengupta, 2006. "Rational Choice and von Neumann– Morgenstern’s Stable Set: The Case of Path-dependent Procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 611-619, December.
    6. He, Junnan, 2012. "A generalized unification theorem for choice theoretic foundations: Avoiding the necessity of pairs and triplets," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-23, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    7. Susumu Cato, 2018. "Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 305-328, February.
    8. Yuval Salant, 2011. "Procedural Analysis of Choice Rules with Applications to Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 724-748, April.
    9. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas & Sengupta, Kunal, 2003. "Intransitive indifference and rationalizability of choice functions on general domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 311-326, December.

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