Competition Law as a Constraint on Monopolistic Exploitation by Sports Leagues and Clubs
AbstractThe sports industry is characterized by dominant leagues and clubs exercising economic power unconstrained by rivals or the threat of entry, often featuring market-division schemes. Leagues and clubs can raise price, lower output, and lower quality to fans, create an artificial scarcity of top-tier teams resulting in publicly subsidized stadiums, and impose labour-market restraints that significantly harm consumers by misallocating players, most obviously by inhibiting low-quality teams' quick improvement. Business decisions made by club-run leagues feature significant transaction costs, resulting in even greater inefficiency than would occur if leagues were controlled by a single entity. Many countries have employed settled principles of competition law, originating in the common law of restraint of trade, as a useful and meaningful constraint on the abuses of economic power in sports. Courts have prohibited agreements between clubs or leagues that distort prices or output, or render output unresponsive to consumer demand, unless the agreement is shown to be demonstrably necessary to achieve a pro-competitive goal. In this paper, I argue that consumers and sports fans will benefit from a more ambitious enforcement of these established principles of competition law. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pelnar, Gregory, 2007. "Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues," MPRA Paper 5382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Philippe Cyrenne, 2009. "Modelling Professional Sports Leagues: An Industrial Organization Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 193-215, May.
- Philippe Cyrenne, 2013. "Player Salaries, Player Mobility and the Invariance Principle: Evidence from the National Hockey League," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, The University of Winnipeg, Department of Economics.
- Stewart, Bob & Nicholson, Matthew & Dickson, Geoff, 2005. "The Australian Football League's Recent Progress: A Study In Cartel Conduct And Monopoly Power," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 95-117, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.