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Political competition and rural welfare: evidence from Pakistan

Author

Listed:
  • Katrina Kosec
  • Hamza Haider
  • David J Spielman
  • Fatima Zaidi

Abstract

Can stronger political competition improve rural livelihoods in developing countries? We explore this question in rural Pakistan, showing that greater political competition in a Provincial Assembly (PA) constituency predicts significantly better access to publicly-provided infrastructure and amenities, but no changes in other public goods including perceived access to justice and security. Nonetheless, overall welfare effects appear to be positive: higher political competition predicts higher expenditures per capita, especially among land-poor households. It also predicts higher land values, greater land wealth, and lower land wealth inequality. Further, political competition increases land rental, possibly indicating improved functionality of land markets. Sensitivity analyses suggest that our estimates are unlikely to be substantially affected by omitted variable bias, and they are further similar to instrumental variables estimates. The findings are also robust to use of alternate measures of political competition. Greater provision of both public and private goods appears to explain welfare improvements.

Suggested Citation

  • Katrina Kosec & Hamza Haider & David J Spielman & Fatima Zaidi, 2018. "Political competition and rural welfare: evidence from Pakistan," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 1036-1061.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:70:y:2018:i:4:p:1036-1061.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpy013
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Datta, Sandip, 2020. "Political competition and public healthcare expenditure: Evidence from Indian states," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 244(C).
    2. Sebri, Maamar & Issoufou Ahmed, Ousseini & Dachraoui, Hajer, 2023. "Public spending and the resource curse in WAEMU countries: An asymmetry analysis using the hidden cointegration and non-linear panel ARDL framework," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    3. Faguet, Jean-Paul & Sánchez, Fabio & Villaveces, Marta-Juanita, 2020. "The perversion of public land distribution by landed elites: Power, inequality and development in Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    4. Kailthya, Subham & Kambhampati, Uma, 2022. "Political competition and public healthcare: Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    5. Yannick V. Markhof, 2020. "Divide to Conquer? Latent Preference Types and Country-level Heterogeneity," CSAE Working Paper Series 2020-05, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    6. Liu, Wai-Man & Ngo, Phong, 2020. "Voting with your feet: Political competition and internal migration in the United States," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • Q11 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis; Prices
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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